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In this thesis, I examine predictors of early-stage success (ESS) for early-stage venture capital 
(ESVC) investments, observable at the point of initial investment.  I use a self-collected 
sample of 30 Norwegian portfolio companies, which all received early-stage funding from a 
single Norwegian ESVC between 2010 and 2014.  A company is characterized as having 
achieved ESS if it succeeds in raising a pre-defined level of additional capital or increased 
sales sufficiently within three years of the initial ESVC investment.  Cross-sectional 
regressions show that a higher number of full-time employees (FTEs) at the point of initial 
ESVC investment significantly improves the likelihood of ESS.  The probability of success is 
also significantly higher for firms with experienced founders, defined as having both prior 
startup experience and a PhD.  Understanding these relationships may help ESVCs reduce risk 























“Technological change is increasingly seen as the primary driver of productivity 
growth, adaptation by financial intermediaries may be equally important to realizing 
the benefits of these new technologies.” 
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“Understanding how capital markets affect the growth and survival of newly created 
firms is perhaps the defining question of entrepreneurial finance.” 
(Robb & Robinson, 2009) 
 
 
In this thesis, I examine predictors of early-stage success (ESS) for early-stage venture capital 
(ESVC) investments, observable at the point of initial investment. 
I analyse a hand-collected sample of 30 Norwegian portfolio companies, which all received 
early-stage funding from a single Norwegian ESVC between 2010-20142.  The data has been 
gathered  through a combination of interviews with firm CEOs & founders, analysis of 
annual reports and dialogue with ESVC partners.  The larger population from which the 
sample is drawn is defined as: Norwegian startups, operating with headquarters in Norway, 
with Norwegian-private citizens or firms as majority owners, who have received funding from 
Norwegian ESVCs.  The sample is drawn from three entire ESVC portfolios, totalling 32 
investments.  Of these, 31 investments match the population definition.  The response rate for 
these firms is 97%. 
I argue that entire ESVC investment portfolios, such as the ones studied here, may be viewed 
as random population samples of ESVC-backed firms: An empirical study of nascent 
entrepreneurs indicated that only 19% of observed entrepreneurs had an ambition to grow 
large, while the remaining 81% had a stated ambition to stay small (Gelderen, Thurik, & 
Bosma, 2005).  As ESVC investment is a pre-requisite for sample inclusion, there is no need 
to further consider firm growth potential.  The ESVCs will only invest in firms deemed to hold 
potential for significant growth and are the market’s most competent judges of this potential.   
A company is characterized as having achieved ESS if it succeeds in raising a pre-defined 
level of additional capital or increased sales sufficiently within three years of the initial ESVC 
investment.  Using ESS as a success criterion provides value as a predictor of absolute success 
for ESVCs, argued by Ewens et al. (2017) and in Chapter 5. 
                                                 
2 87% of sample funded between 2010-2012. 
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Cross-sectional regressions show that a higher number of full-time employees (referenced as 
FTEs) at the point of initial ESVC investment significantly improves the probability of ESS.  
The probability of success is also significantly higher for firms with experienced founders, 
defined as holding both prior startup experience and a PhD.  I test a total of six cross-sectional 
regression models, based on different uncertainties in the recording of the determinants.   
If discovered relationships could be reliably quantified, the resulting reduced risk in ESVC 
investment decisions could improve capital efficiency.  The hope is that this may contribute 
to increasing the total volume of available venture capital, at a time when the Norwegian 
startup economy is in rapid growth (Abelia, 2017). 
3.1 A Broad Overview 
Chapter 4 presents an overview of academic literature, focusing on arguments relating to the 
conducted empirical analysis. 
Chapter 5 presents a theoretical argument for the value of ESS, building upon a decision 
framework presented by Ewens et al. (2017), representing the investor’s game tree.  I argue 
that ESS creates a significant improvement in the probability of liquid returns on investment 
for the ESVC. 
Chapter 6 elaborates on the data collection process, while Chapter 7 presents the structure 
of the empirical analysis.  The research question and hypotheses are formalized here. 
Chapter 8 contains the results of the empirical study and comments on each hypothesis in 
light of the results.  Chapter 9 contains brief discussions and a consideration of internal and 
external validity of the study. 
Chapter 10 contains future research steps.  They are organized at a macro, methodological 
and micro level. 
The conclusion is written in Chapter 11. 
The Appendix elaborates upon the collected data.  It includes tables of descriptive statistics 




4. Literature Review 
4.1 Introductory Remarks 
Studying the academic literature has provided both general inspiration for the conducted 
empirical study and specific arguments that the thesis leans upon.  These arguments are 
presented below:   
4.2 Different Definitions of Success 
Distinguishing between the different definitions of success for the startup used in different 
studies, makes it easier to understand the differences in insights that they provide. The 
distinction is important, as it clearly sets the aim of this thesis apart from similar papers.   
Some example definitions follow: Gelderen et al. (2005) define success for the nascent 
entrepreneur3 as starting their business; Robb & Robinson (2009) define success for the 
nascent firm4 as survival through the first year of operations; Bernstein et al. (2015) define 
success for young startups as securing early-stage funding.   
The success criterion in this thesis is Early-Stage Success (ESS), defined as an un-calculable 
but significant improvement in the probability of tangible returns for ESVCs5.  This 
improvement is measured three years from the point of initial investment by ESVCs. 
4.3 Differences in Employed Methodology 
Through the use a randomized field experiment, Bernstein et al. (2015) present suggestive 
causal evidence of specific investor preference towards certain attributes of the startup.  The 
methodology is employed on an original dataset consisting of roughly 17 000 e-mails sent to 
roughly 4 500 investors on the AngelList platform6. 
                                                 
3 A person undertaking activities to create a business is referred to as the nascent entrepreneur, and the founding effort is called the nascent 
entrepreneurship (Reynolds & White, 1992). 
4 A firm in its first year of operations is referred to as the nascent firm (Robb & Robinson, 2009). 
5 See Chapter 6.3.1 for detailed definition of ESS. 
6 AngelList is a platform for startups to raise money online, recruit employees, and apply for funding.  In 2017 the platform had profiles of 
over 70 000 startups (Forbes, 2017). 
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An empirical study done by Kerr et al. (2010) exploits small changes in the collective interest 
levels of angel investors.  They argue that this can lead to a discrete change in probability of 
funding for otherwise comparable ventures. 
Both Bernstein et al. (2015) and Kerr et al. (2010) use the securing of funding as a success 
criterion, rather than as a pre-requisite for inclusion in their data-sample.  This thesis uses 
securing of funding as the prerequisite for inclusion in the observed population.  Kerr et al. 
(2010) addresses challenges related to creating a representative sample as unsigned deals are 
not formally archived, a problem Bernstein et al (2015) solve through use of their 
methodology.   
Bernstein et al. (2015) are left with the problem of considering whether or not investors are 
right to focus their attention as their results indicate that they currently do.  They address this 
issue, deferring to the ongoing debate between what factors predict future success of an early-
stage firm – the idea or the human capital – as discussed by Kaplan et al. (2007).  They further 
defer by explaining how their methodology and the early developmental stage of sample firms 
prevents them from answering the question directly. 
4.3.1 Comments 
It is my hypothesis that the framing presented by Kaplan et al. (2007) is misleading, as it 
implies that either the idea or human capital should be generally dominant.  One of the two 
factors may correlate stronger with success than the other, though it is possible that the secret 
to minimizing investment risk lies within objectively understanding which combination of 
characteristics (both human and non-human) most accurately predict future success for early-
stage startups.   
This thesis defines ESS as its success criteria and the securing of funding as the pre-requisite 
for inclusion in the sample.  These methodological alterations aim among other things to 
address: (1) The problem of representative samples faced by Kerr et al. (2010) and (2) the 
inability to directly answer whether or not investors are right to focus their attention as they 
currently do, faced by Bernstein et al. (2015).  The methodology employed by this thesis is 
further discussed in Chapter 7. 
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4.4 The Primary Source of Early-Stage Growth 
While the active role of the VC is found to significantly improve the probability of success, it 
is secondary to the underlying potential of the startup (Sorensen, 2006). 
Robb & Robinson (2009) clearly demonstrate that nascent firms with access to relatively high 
amounts of outside debt (funds without active ownership) are significantly more likely to: (1) 
Be in their sample’s top revenue group, and (2) to have hired employees.  These results7 show 
that even without professional active ownership, the trademark of early stage equity investors, 
increased capital is linked to increased growth.  This result further compliments Sorensen 
(2006), who’s study implies that VC-skill is not the dominant factor when considering 
investment portfolio success-rate.  If a disciplinary effect of debt on management behaviour 
(Jensen, 1986) does not cancel out the value of active ownership associated with outside equity 
(Sorensen, 2006) (Cornelli & Yosha, 2003), debt may provide an additional boost to the 
probability of success for the young firm.   
Hochberg et al. (2014) argue that in a large sample of U.S. VC firms, 67.8% of observed VCs 
lack skill.  VCs subsequently go out of business after raising on average 2.7 funds in their 
lifetime.  They argue that the rarity of skill is due in part to high idiosyncratic risk and the 
large percentage of failed individual portfolio firms. 
4.5 Rise of the “Spray & Pray” VC Investment Strategy 
The “Spray & Pray”8 investment strategy is a concept presented by Ewens et al. (2017), 
referring to an observed shift in investment strategy by VCs.  The shift has been from larger 
investments in firms, including governance9; to smaller investments into a larger number of 
firms, including little to no governance10. 
Ewens et al. (2017) argue that this is a consequence of the technological shock created by the 
introduction of the Amazon Web Services (AWS).  AWS eliminated startups need to invest 
up-front in server-infrastructure, causing significant Capital Expenditure (CapEx) to shift 
                                                 
7 Only 5% of their sample containing over 4 000 firms held outside equity during the observed period. 
8 The term “Spray & Pray” may be analogous to a term condescendingly used to describe the strategy poorly skilled riflemen use when firing 
upon their target.  The term describes the opposite of a carefully aimed shot: Rapidly firing multiple shots in the appointed general direction, 
praying that some of the projectiles make contact with the target. 
9 Exemplified by the number of investments where the VC takes (a) board seat(s). 
10 This shift has specifically been observed in tech-startups. 
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towards later rounds of financing.  In affected sectors, VC’s make more frequent use of their 
relatively cheaper abandonment options.  This can be seen, as no significant increase in the 
number of follow-on investments is observed in the study. Investors are demonstrably required 
to consider and analyse a larger number of potential investments. It is possible, I argue, that 
the increased number of investments implies that less thorough due diligence is being 
conducted per startup. 
There are more younger and in-experienced founders in light of the technological shock 
(Ewens, Nanda, & Rhodes-Kropf, 2017). These founders may require more guidance and 
mentorship than startups run by more experienced entrepreneurs.  Gelderen et al. (2005) find 
that inexperienced founders benefitted significantly from advice and information, though the 
results are not directly comparable due to the differing definitions of success. 
Increased prevalence of the “Spray & Pray” methodology is synonymous with a reduction in 
the importance of active ownership to early-stage investment.  Sorensen (2006) finds that 
already before the 2006 technological shock studied by Ewens (2017), the underlying potential 
of the startup is twice as important in predicting success as the direct influence of the VC. 
The finding helps to explain the rise of new financial intermediaries, who provide cost 
effective and scalable mentorship to the startup.   
4.6 Current Early-Stage Investor Preferences 
Bernstein et al. (2015) find suggestive causal evidence that startups with experienced founding 
teams have a significantly improved probability of attracting early-stage investment.  
Experienced investors respond strongly to positive information about the founding team, 
though not to firm traction or existing lead investors. Inexperienced investors react strongly to 
positive information in all three categories.   
This finding shows that investors are currently placing more weight on the founding team than 
the idea.  This contradicts Kaplan et al. (2007) conclusion, that more weight should be placed 
on the firm idea, due to substantial management turnover during the lifetime of the startup. 
Bernstein et al.’s findings (2015) offer a clear example of how investors are currently 
behaving.  The curiosity driving this thesis is not related to current investor behaviour, but to 
what objectively measurable factors may correlate with success in the early-stage startup.  
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Further research might compare the results of the conducted analysis with current investor 
methodology, possibly creating an argument for the altering of current investor behaviour. 
4.7 The Staging of VC Investments 
This empirical study is predicated on stage investments.  It is therefore relevant to reference 
the regularity of stage-financing in the VC market.  The prevalence of stage financing to 
mitigate investment risk for early-stage investors is clearly documented in the academic 
literature (Ewens, Nanda, & Rhodes-Kropf, 2017) (Cornelli & Yosha, 2003) (Tian, 2010). 
4.8 Concluding remarks 
This thesis aims to improve the investor’s ability to select the startups most likely to generate 
liquid returns.   
The academic literature considered above suggests that the provision of funds is the primary 
way in which ESVCs improve the probability of success for startups (Sorensen, 2006) (Robb 
& Robinson, 2009) (Ewens, Nanda, & Rhodes-Kropf, 2017) (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & 
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2014).  Consequently, I argue that the most important attribute for VC 
success is a well-developed mechanism for selecting startups with the highest underlying 
potential of success. 
This thesis empirically tests a mechanism for identifying observable startup characteristics, 
which correlate with success pre-investment.  It may therefore contribute to increasing the 
efficiency of the Early-Stage Venture Capital market. 
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5. A Theoretical Argument  
5.1 The Value of Measuring Early-Stage Success 
Ewens et al. (2017) present in their paper a model for the purpose of simplifying the process 
of understanding multi-stage financing.  I build upon their model to clarify the value of 
increased quantitative analysis of observable startup characteristics, pre-investment. 
They develop the following decision framework: 
 
The model (see Figure 1) explains the expected returns for the investor given the possible 
outcomes of a two-stage investment.  At the point of initial investment, the investors may 
choose to invest, or not to invest.  If they choose not to invest, they retain $X+$Y but receive 
no return on investment.  If they choose to invest, $X is placed into the firm with a probability 
𝑃1 of initial experimentation generating positive information (denoted in the model as success 
or failure). After the initial experimentation has either succeeded or failed, the investor will 
again be faced with the choice of a further investment of $Y or retaining this sum.  If the 
investor choses to invest $Y, he will either have done so after initial experimentation has 
generated positive information, or in spite of it not doing so.  The expected probability of 
success after the second stage investment, is denoted 𝑃𝑆 if the initial round of experimentation 
was a success, or 𝑃𝐹 if the initial experimentation was a failure.  Success in the second round 
will lead to a payoff of V. 
Figure 1: Extensive Form Representation of the Investor’s Game Tree  
(Ewens, Nanda, & Rhodes-Kropf, 2017) 
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The aim of this thesis is to measure firm characteristics, known before the investor must 
choose whether to invest $X, and attempt to correlate them with increased or decreased 
probability of first-stage success. 
5.1.1 Analysis 
Success based on e.g. Robb & Robinson (2009) or Bernstein et al. (2015) relates to the ultimate 
payoff, V.  This is difficult to measure within the model parameters, as applying this 
theoretical framework practically would likely imply adding several steps from initial 
investment to payoff V. Added complexity arises, as the total amount of years that the funds 
are invested may well exceed a decade. 
Success as defined by this thesis is an indicator of success, rather than Absolute Success (AS).  
This is disadvantageous as there is still a probability of failure after initial experimentation; it 
does, however, have the clear advantage of being measurable. 
The implications of this may be incorporated into the framework as follows: 
𝑃𝑆 & 𝑃𝐹 are conditional expectations of a probability, conditional on the success or failure of 
the initial experimentation.  Their denotation is listed below as in the work of Ewens et al. 
(Ewens, Nanda, & Rhodes-Kropf, 2017). 
𝑃𝑆 = 𝐸[𝑃2|𝑆] 
𝑃𝐹 = 𝐸[𝑃2|𝐹] 
𝐸[𝑃2] is the unconditional expectation of success of the second investment stage. 
 
𝑆 & 𝐹 denote the occurrence of success or failure of the first stage. 
 
Building on this model, I formalize the implied assumption that the true value of 𝑃2 is 
unobservable (both conditional and unconditional) and change the conditional denotations 
appropriately:  
𝑃𝑆 = 𝑈𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 
𝑃𝐹 = 𝑈𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 
𝑃𝑆
′  ≙  𝑃𝑆 
𝑃𝐹
′  ≙  𝑃𝐹  
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It is assumed that a meaningful conditional estimate of 𝑃2 
may only be calculated after the conclusion of the initial 
experimental phase. 
In the model, investors consider staging an investment of $X, then $Y in a startup with 𝑃1 
probability of initial experimentation being a success.  It is assumed that in the second 
investment stage, 𝑃𝑆 > 𝑃𝐹.  It follows that success after initial experimentation implies a 
higher likelihood of attaining V than does failure.  Therefore, success in initial 
experimentation, leading to 𝑃𝑆 probability of payoff V, always maximizes the investors 
chances of receiving the payoff.  It is thus desirable to maximize the value of  𝑃1, even though 
success in initial experimentation is only an indicator of future success, not future success in 
itself. 
The probability of receiving payoff V for the investor’s investment of $𝑋 + $𝑌 pre-investment 
is: 
𝑃(𝑉) = 𝑃1 ∗ 𝑃𝑆 +  (1 − 𝑃1) ∗ 𝑃𝐹       where 𝑃𝑆 > 𝑃𝐹 
This implies that the expected value of V is: 
𝐸(𝑉) = 𝑉 ∗ 𝑃(𝑉) 
 
Assume that 𝑃𝑆 & 𝑃𝐹 are unobservable probabilities (even by approximation) at the point of 
initial investment.  In order to maximize the expected value of V, one must then maximize the 
value of 𝑃1 , 𝑉, or both. 
Maximizing V 
Maximizing V is an abstract exercise in comparison to the maximization of 𝑃1 .  This is because 
V is an approximated value (though this is no explicitly stated by Ewens et al.).  Clarification 
of notation is again in order: 
𝑉 = 𝑈𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 
𝑉′ ≙ 𝑉 
The true unobservable value of 𝑉 will vary from startup to startup, as will the observable 
approximation.  This implies that what we are in truth calculating is: 
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𝑃(𝑉′) = 𝑃1 ∗ 𝑃𝑆 +  (1 − 𝑃1) ∗ 𝑃𝐹       where 𝑃𝑆 > 𝑃𝐹 
This implies that the expected true value of V becomes: 
𝐸(𝑉) = 𝑉′ ∗ 𝑃(𝑉′) 
As 𝑃𝑆 and 𝑃𝐹 are meaningfully unobservable even by approximation at the point of initial 
investment, an approximation of 𝑉 may not be estimated at the point of initial investment.  
This implies that the probability of payoff 𝑃(𝑉′) remains incalculable.   
It therefore becomes relevant to consider viewing 𝑉′ as a roughly constant high payoff across 
a category of startups defined as holding high potential.  The implication is that variation in 𝑉’ 
across these startups is not relevant, but variation in the probability of a payoff occurring is: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑉′) ≈ 0 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃(𝑉′)) ≠ 0 
 
Within the defined category of high potential startups, 
implying a high minimum value for 𝑉’ 
Maximizing 𝑉′ thus becomes a question of selecting startups that exist within a category 
defined as high potential, rather than filtering individual startups within this category.  This 
thesis does this by only including startups which have been invested in by professional early 
stage investors managing professionally raised funds.   
The remaining uncertainty is defined as variation in the probability of a payoff occurring.  As 
meaningful estimates of 𝑃𝑠 & 𝑃𝐹 are unobservable within the scope of this thesis, risk at the 
point of initial investment is minimized by maximizing 𝑃1. 
Maximizing 𝑃1 
Maximizing 𝑃1 may be done by selecting the startups that have the highest probability of 
succeeding in the first experimental phase.  Clarifying notation follows: 
 
𝑃1 = 𝑈𝑛𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 
𝑃1




What fundamentally drives this thesis is a belief that uncertainty in the estimation of 𝑃1
′ may 
realistically be decreased.  Uncertainty (or variance) in 𝑃1
′ reduces the probability that ESVCs 
maximize the 𝑃1  of their investment portfolios. Reduction in the variance of 𝑃1
′ would 
therefore reduce risk and increase the efficiency of capital allocation in ESVC portfolios.  My 
argument thus becomes: 
 
The variance of 𝑃1
′ may plausibly be reduced.  Investors should minimize the variation in the 
estimate of 𝑃1












Lack of startups with high true values of 𝑃1
  is an external supply problem.  Investors may not 
through their primary activities increase the supply of startups with a high true probability of 
success11.  Reducing the variation of the observable estimate for 𝑃1, however, is a learnable 
skill, well within the scope of the primary activities of the investor. 
I aim to successfully correlate objective and observable factors of individual firms, pre-
investment, to success in the first experimentation phase.  This will contribute to indicating 
which startups have the highest true value of 𝑃1 .  Note that this assumes that 𝑃𝑆 > 𝑃𝐹, which 
is not tested empirically by this thesis.  
5.2 Concluding Remarks 
The direct value of the empirical analysis rests on the assumption that ESS is a significant 
predictor of AS, as argued by Ewens et al. (2017).  It may also be inferred through investor 
behaviour that they believe this to be true, observed through the prevalence of stage-
financing12.  I have not found any direct test of the validity of this claim, nor am I able to 
confirm or reject it within the scope of this thesis.   
 
                                                 
11 Looking at ways to plausibly increase supply, perhaps by looking deeply at the reasons for startup failure and aiming to formalize methods to avoid those most 
common on the part of the startup, may contribute to increasing the supply of high-potential startups. 
12 See Chapter 4.7. 
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6. Data Collection Process 
“…the dearth of data on very early stage firms makes it difficult for researchers to look 
further back in firms’ life histories.” 
(Robb & Robinson, 2009) 
6.1 Database Structuring 
6.1.1 Introductory Remarks 
I argue that a complete ESVC portfolio of firms can viewed as a random sample of firms that 
receive ESVC investment.  The database was therefore constructed by identifying entire 
investment portfolios, then working to gather data from each individual investment within the 
portfolio. 
The final gathered database consists of three complete portfolios from a single Norwegian 
ESVC, totalling 32 firms.  This includes all failed investments which have been removed from 
the ESVC’s websites.  Two firms have incomplete data entries, one of which does not match 
the population criterion. 
Each entry represents the ESVCs first investment into a given startup.  They consist of cross-
sectional data from the point of initial investment by the ESVC (59 variables per firm).  Cross-
sectional data has also been gathered 3 years post initial investment (22 variables per firm).  
The post-investment data has been condensed to the binary variable Early-Stage Success 
(ESS).  ESS is used as the dependent variable in all regression testing.  The database considers 
the entire initial investment, including cases where the ESVC investor is not the only investor 
in the initial round of financing.  
There is idiosyncratic risk at the investor-level.  The ESVC may have an investment strategy 
or general skill-level which produces results that differ markedly from the larger population 
of Norwegian ESVCs. 
6.1.2 The Process 
Cold-calling at the ESVC level led to meaningful dialogue with the CFO of an ESVC.  Had 
the ESVC not provided their blessing and been helpful during the data-collection process I 
would not have succeeded in gathering data from entire portfolios. 
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A single ESVC provided access to their portfolio-firms.  A total of three ESVCs were willing 
to speak to me through in-person meetings and conferencing-software.  The primary benefit 
of these discussions was related to the structure of the database, its variables, as well as 
feedback on the hypotheses. 
The collection process made use of the following primary tools: 
E-mail 
Initial contact with portfolio firms was done via e-mail.  Upon reaching the individual firm a 
phone-interview was scheduled. 
Phone Interviews 
Phone interviews were conducted for all firms in the database, with the exception of certain 
abandoned firms, for which interviews were instead conducted with a partner who had served 
as a board member of the firm in question.  The interview had two parts: 
1. Walk-through of specific questions while inputting responses into the database 
2. General conversation relating to the theme of the thesis, receiving general advice on possible 
challenges, as well as insights they had learned over the course of running their respective 
firms. 
Each part of the interview would usually take roughly 15 minutes, with the first section 
occasionally exceeding this time period, and the second part varying in both directions of time. 
Annual reports 
It was necessary to supplement the interview-data with data from annual reports for several 
reasons, to which I became increasingly aware as the interview process went by:  
1. Some data was not recalled or accessibly stored by the CEOs 
2. Some of the data provided by the CEOs was an estimate at best 
3. Some CEOs were indicating that total interview-time exceeding 30 minutes was more of their 
time than they were interested in sharing 
Roughly 120 annual reports were analysed and double-checked against interview answers.  In 
the cases where they did not match, data from the annual reports were used.  This reduced 
interview-times and improved data-quality. 
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6.2 Data Sample 
The data-sample used in the empirical analysis is limited to Norwegian startups, operating 
with headquarters in Norway, with Norwegian-private citizens or firms as majority owners, 
which have received funding from Norwegian ESVCs.   
The analysed data-sample makes use of 30 firms and 17 variables, including the ESS variable, 
defined in Chapter 7.3.1.  One foreign portfolio firm does not match the population definition.  
Bar this, the sample contains complete data entries for 97% of the 31 eligible portfolio firms. 
6.3 Calculating new fields 
The data-sample makes use of two calculated fields, (1) Early-Stage Success, and (2) 
Experienced Founders.  They are defined below: 
6.3.1 Early-Stage Success 
To define whether a firm has achieved ESS or not, a checklist of questions is considered for 
each firm.  If the answer to any of these questions are yes, then the firm is defined as having 
achieved ESS.  The checklist of questions has been considered by academic and market 
professionals and is included below:  
Definitions: 
• Post-investment: Refers to a point in time three years after the initial ESVC-investment 
The minimum requirement for ESS is a YES to at least one of the following questions: 
1. Has the firm raised 25MNOK or more post-investment? 
2. Has the firm achieved all of the following post-investment? 
a. Raised 10MNOK or more 
b. Raised twice or more of its original investment 
c. Raised capital from new external investors 
3. Has the firm achieved all of the following post-investment? 
a. Raised 10MNOK or more post-investment 
b. Increased Valuation by more than 50% 
4. Has the firm achieved all of the following post-investment? 
a. Sold goods for more than 2.5MNOK on average per year 
b. Annualized average sales 3y post-/pre-investment have declined by less than 10% 
c. Sold total amount of goods for more than 25MNOK since founding 
5. Has the firm achieved all of the following post-investment? 
a. Sold goods for more than 1.5MNOK on average per year 
b. Annualized average sales, 3y post/pre, have increased by more than 200% 




Reducing such an uncertain and subjective concept as Early-Stage Success (ESS) of a startup, 
down to a binary variable requires the use of subjective judgement.  In order to efficiently 
analyse the results of this analysis, one must first familiarize oneself with the definition of ESS 
used in this thesis. 
What Does ESS Attempt to Explain? 
ESS describes a state of being for the firm, three years post ESVC-investment, for which the 
perceived chance of future AS is above a defined threshold.   
Lack of ESS is not a direct indication of a firm’s failure.  The possible conditions of unclear 
future outlook, negative future outlook, as well as failed investment, are all contained within 
the category of non-ESS.  This thesis focuses on the analysis of firms which achieve ESS and 
has therefore not made further clarifications of the firms that have not achieved this state. 
Concluding Remarks on ESS 
A firm has achieved ESS either if it (1) has raised a significant amount of new capital, with 
borderline cases holding extra restrictions on increased valuation and the inclusion of new 
external investors; or (2) if it has had a stable significant amount of annual sales without 
significant decline, with borderline cases holding extra restrictions on minimum growth in 
sales. 
I believe that the resulting applied definition of ESS provides a good representation of the state 
of each individual data-entry 3 years post-investment. 
6.3.2 Experienced Founders 
Existing academic literature indicates that experienced founders are more likely to be 
successful than founders who are not experienced (Bernstein, Korteweg, & Laws, 2015) 
(Gelderen, Thurik, & Bosma, 2005).  Experience is, however, not a directly observable 
variable in the same way as the valuation of the firm at the point of initial investment.   
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It therefore becomes necessary to create an instrument for experienced founders.  I define this 
though a binary variable, equal to one if the founding team holds both previous founding 
experience, as well as a PhD.   
Roughly two thirds of the data sample founders hold a PhD.  Closer study of the impact a PhD 
holds on the probability of success therefore becomes relevant.  Examining whether this 
combination of experience correlates with ESS is to the extent of my knowledge a novel 
approach.   
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
While collecting data I have failed to add a variable observing the number of people in the 
founding team as well as in management - this has limited the analysis.  Another failure related 
to the structuring of the database is the failure to include a variable indicating whether or not 
the founder is working full-time on their startup.  Gelderen et al. (2005) find that founders 
working full-time on their startup increase its chance of success.  After gathering data and 
seeing the number of founders not working full-time on their startup, I now believe that there 
should have been defined a variable checking whether the founders worked full-, part-, or no-
time on their startup.  This would allow tests regarding whether the finding of Gelderen et al. 
(2005) remains significant across the changing definition of success.   
Certain sample firms were started by non-individual founders, meaning that they were owned 
entirely by other firms or research groups from nascency. 
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7. Structuring the Empirical Analysis 
7.1 Introductory Remarks 
The empirical analysis consists of descriptive statistics and cross-sectional regressions 
conducted on the data-sample.  The structure of the analysis is elaborated upon below. 
7.2 Structuring Research Question 
The Early-Stages of the capital market is arguably where there is the most risk to investors 
and firms alike (Kerr, Nanda, & Rhodes-Kropf, 2014) (Cornelli & Yosha, 2003) (Ewens, 
Nanda, & Rhodes-Kropf, 2017).  I argue that this makes performing empirical analysis here 
particularly important.  The aim of this analysis is not to eliminate observed risk, but to 
contribute to its significant reduction.  
The research question empirically tested by this thesis is: 
Are there statistically significant and relevant correlations between objective and 
quantifiable variables within startups, known at the point of initial ESVC investment, 
and Early-Stage Success? 
7.3 Structuring Hypotheses 
To test this research question, a set of four hypotheses have been structured, intended to be 
tested in the cross-sectional regression analysis.  The hypotheses were derived from previous 
academic literature, as well as repeated iterations of rationalizing and seeking feedback from 
market and academic professionals.  An overview of the hypotheses and the rationale behind 
selecting them follows: 
7.3.1 Experienced Founders are Positively Correlated with ESS 
This is considered due to the suggestive causal evidence put forward by Bernstein et al. (2015) 
indicating that experienced founders increase the probability of attracting early-stage 
investment. Gelderen et al. (2005) also find that experienced founders are more likely to 
achieve success. 
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Kerr et al. (2007) show in their paper that management turnover is significant throughout the 
lifetime of a successful startup.  In the observed segment of startup development13, I 
hypothesize that experienced founders are correlated with the probability of achieving Early-
Stage Success. 
Founder experience must be instrumented, as it is not directly measurable. I test this hypothesis 
through the use of the “Experienced Founder” variable14. 
I define a founder as having held significant equity in the firm (above 10% or 2MNOK worth) 
since its establishment.  A founder has also been defined as an individual and not a company.  
Over the course of the data-collection process, I became aware that different firms (research 
groups and others) were often a part of the founder mix.   
7.3.2 Focus on Diversification is Positively Correlated with ESS 
The second hypothesis stems from the argument that diversification reduces idiosyncratic risk, 
as well as facilitating synergies (assuming that this value outweighs the lost value of 
specialized focus).  It also bases itself on the law of diminishing returns, implying that two 
engineers may achieve less than an engineer and a BA-Graduate (under the theoretical 
assumption that their level of skill is held equal). 
A startup is faced with considerable amounts of commercial and technological risk (depending 
on progress and the degree of technological innovation).  Consequently, the correct course of 
action is rarely clear.  I hypothesize that diversification may increase the probability of ESS. 
This thesis tests for diversification through the use of two variables based on dialogue with 
market professionals: 
1. Amount of planned independent revenue categories, defined as the number of individual, 
independent revenue sources planned at the point of initial ESVC investment.  This variable 
instruments revenue diversification.   
2. Customer portfolio diversification, defined as the number of paying customers at the point 
of initial investment.  The firm must have sales exceeding 1MNOK in the last twelve months 
to qualify as having any paying customers.  This variable instruments diversification of the 
customer portfolio. 
                                                 
13 From the point of initial ESVC investment to three years post-investment. 
14 Defined in Chapter 7.3.2. 
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7.3.3 Wage-Compensated Employees are Positively Correlated with 
ESS 
Gelderen et al. (2005) find that nascent entrepreneurs working full-time on their startup had a 
significantly higher probability of achieving success than those who did not.  Will a similar 
result hold true if we observe the number of full-time employees at the point of initial 
investment for the sample firms? 
Increasing the monthly costs to the firm may increases the chance of success.  The firm may 
fail quicker than it would have otherwise, though I believe that positive psychological effects 
may be at play when the sum of monthly wages is increased. 
1. The effect of going “all inn” may instil a sense of purpose and urgency to the firm’s employees 
2. Being compensated with valuable limited resources may instil a sense of responsibility. 
3. A firm that compensates its employees with fair wages is at a more advanced stage, than one 
which does not.  Being aware of this fact may have positive psychological effects on the 
productivity and efficiency of the employees 
This thesis does not focus on psychology, though including a consideration of psychological 
factors which may be in play at the level of the individual involved in the startup seems fitting. 
I test this hypothesis through the use of the “Wage-compensated Full-Time Employees 
(FTEs)” variable.  Employees are defined as holding less than 5% equity or equity worth less 
than 2MNOK. 
The number of FTEs is listed in each firm’s annual report, eliminating insecurity relating to 
data-collection. 
7.3.4 Size of the Initial ESVC Investment Correlates with the 
Probability of ESS 
Robb & Robinson (2009) show that for nascent firms, access to increased levels of capital 
correlates with increased growth after twelve months of operations.  I hypothesize that the 
same holds true for the size of the initial ESVC funding round.   
I test this hypothesis through a variable measuring the level of raised capital in the initial 
ESVC investment.  This variable also functions as a control for the level of capital raised for 
the individual portfolio investment. 
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7.4 Structuring Control Variables 
When tested in the cross-sectional regression, the hypothesis variables act as controls for each 
other.  There are, however, also specific aspects I would like to control for in order to produce 
a more homogenous sample.  Two sets of control variables are explained below: 
7.4.1 The Primary Control Variables 
There are two primary control variables which are included in the cross-sectional regression.  
Their purpose is to create a more homogenous sample: 
1. Valuation: The valuation of the firm controls for the different stages of progression at the 
point of initial investment.  Though valuations are arguably imperfect at the point of initial 
ESVC investment15, I hypothesize that their measurement acts as a valuable control for 
progress. 
2. The Level of Sales in the Last Twelve Months (LTM): The level of sales LTM is also a control 
for progression, directly angled towards interaction with the market.  Controlling for 
interaction with the market may usefully narrow the gap between firms with different 
estimated times to market, as well as different degrees of technological innovation. 
 
7.4.2 The Alternative Control Variables 
The alternative setup of control variables substitutes the level of sales LTM for the estimated 
time to market at the point of initial investment.  The valuation variable is kept unchanged: 
1. Valuation: Unchanged. 
2. Estimated Time to Market: The estimated time to market effectively controls for the 
degree to which the individual investment is primarily faced with R&D16 or commercial & 
implementation risk.  Controlling for the estimated time to market thus makes it easier to 
compare the risk profiles of firms facing considerably different developmental challenges. 
 
The estimated time to market is an estimate given by the founder/CEO of each individual 
sample firm.  It is used as a secondary alternative due to the added risk of recording error that 
stems from the data-collection process.  The founder/CEO is asked to recall a non-binding 
estimate given 4-8 years ago, subject to regular change over time.  Given perfect information 
this variable may have been considered superior to the level of sales LTM. 
                                                 
15 Claim based on my interviews with founders/CEOs of the sample firms. 
16 Research & Development 
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Estimated time to market might, given a larger sample, be recorded as a discrete variable, 
listing different categories of estimated time to market17.  This might also reduce the recording 
uncertainty present in the current sample. 
7.5 Structuring Cross-Sectional Regressions 
A total of six cross-sectional regressions have been conducted in two sequences of three to 
test the four hypotheses and the research question.  All regressions use ESS as the dependent 
variable. 
As the second hypothesis includes recording risk18, the sequence of three regressions is run 
once for each of the two variables described in Chapter 8.3.2. 
The variables from the four hypotheses are first regressed without the control variables.  The 
regression is then repeated including the Primary Control Variables.  It is then run a third time, 
substituting the Primary Control Variables for the Alternative Control Variables. 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
The variables used in the regression analysis are based on data recorded either from annual 
reports or interviews + LinkedIn data.  I identify an added risk stemming from possible 
recording errors when the variables are based solely on interview answers.  This has 
manifested itself in the dual sequence of the cross-sectional regressions, in an attempt to reduce 
the possible impact this risk will have on the final results. 
The experienced founder variable is not based on information from annual reports, though it 
has been supplemented with clear and concise information from LinkedIn.  As a consequence 
of this I consider the risk of recording errors in this variable to be low.  
                                                 
17 E.g.: (1) Less than one year, (2) 1-3 years, (3), 3-5 years, (4) more than five years. 
18 They are based on interview estimates, rather than data from annual reports. 
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8. Results 
8.1 Introductory Remarks 
The results section will, (1) present descriptive statistics of general sample variables, the 
hypothesis variables and the control variables, (2) present and discuss the results of the cross-
sectional analysis, (3) comment on each hypothesis in light of the results, and (4) end with a 
consideration of the internal and external validity of the study. 
8.2 General Descriptive Statistics 
Included below is a selection of descriptive statistics.  The Appendix includes a complete 





The General Variables table (Table 1) presents the distributions of binary general variables (1) throughout the entire sample, (2) the sub-
sample of ESS observations, (3) the sub-sample of non-ESS observations, and (4) the difference between the ESS and non-ESS distributions.  
Star(s) next to a difference value indicates the degree to which it is statistically significant19. 
The variables concern (1) whether the firm considered itself to have a high, medium or low degree of technological innovation and (2) 
whether there were paying customers in the last twelve months pre-investment (instrumented by whether sales exceeded 1MNOK in the year 
of investment). 
8.2.1 Year Funded 
Variable grouping data-sample by the year it 
was first funded by the ESVC (see Figure 13).  
The majority of firms are funded from 2010-
2012.  All are funded after the financial crisis 
and most before the 2014 price collapse of 
Brent Crude Oil. 
                                                 
19 ∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.1, ∗∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.05, ∗∗∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.01. 
Figure 13: Column chart showing a count of sample firms by 
the year that they were first funded by the ESVC. 
 




% n % n % n % n
n 100% 30               53% 16             47% 14               6% 2
High Tech 73% 22 59% 13 41% 9                 13% 4
Med. Tech 23% 7 29% 2 71% 5                 -42% -3
Low Tech 3% 1 100% 1 0% -              100% 1
Cust. LTM? 50% 15 60% 9 40% 6                 20% 3
non-ESSESSAll Difference
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8.2.2 Broader Industry 
Variable cataloguing different broader 
industries prevalent in the sample, 
shown in Figure 14. 
8.2.3 General Remarks  
The general variables are intended to 
provide general information about the data-sample.  Given a larger data sample, they would 
have been additionally useful as possible control variables, which would have allowed for 
more specific analysis of the startups. 
The general variables gathered by this thesis, clarify the need for strict variable definitions in 
order to secure that they function as intended. 
8.2.4 Founder Background Variables 
Separate attention has been given to different founder background variables, in light of the 
suggestive causal evidence presented by Bernstein et al. (2015), linking strong founding teams 
to increased likelihood of equity investment.  Bernstein et al.’s (2015) results are based on the 
founding team having attended a prestigious school and/or having relevant work/founding 
experience.  Using the following founder background variables, I hope to observe the founding 









Figure 14: Bar chart showing a count of the firms in different broader 





The Founder Background Variables table (Table 2) presents the distributions of binary founder background variables (1) throughout the 
entire sample, (2) the sub-sample of ESS observations, (3) the sub-sample of non-ESS observations, and (4) the difference between the ESS 
and non-ESS distributions.  Star(s) next to a difference value indicates the degree to which it is statistically significant20. 
The variables concern different aspects of the founding team: (1) the highest level of formal higher education (PhD, Masters, Bachelors, or 
none), (2) whether there is domain experience in the founding team, (3) whether the founding team has previous founding experience, (4) 
whether the founding team includes a BA graduate, and (5) whether the founders were experienced per the presented definition in Chapter 
7.3.2. 
 
As shown in Table 2, the sample consists of founding teams which primarily hold a PhD., 
while roughly a third of observed firms have previous founding or domain experience.  The 
variable instrumenting whether founders are experienced has a clear tilt towards ESS, though 
the number of observations limits the significance of the results. 
Only 10% of the sample founders have a business administration background, though 100% 
of observed BA Graduate founders achieve ESS.  The numbers relating to BA Graduate 
founders are too small to conduct empirical analysis, though the result does provoke questions 
regarding the value of BA Graduates in startups. 
  
                                                 
20 ∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.1, ∗∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.05, ∗∗∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.01. 
Founder Background Variables
n=30
% n % n % n % n
PhD 63% 19 63% 12 37% 7               26% 5              
Masters 23% 7                  43% 3               57% 4               -14% 1              
Bachelor 10% 3 33% 1 67% 2               -33% 1              
No formal edu. 3% 1 0% 0 100% 1               -100% 1              
Domain XP 33% 10 60% 6 40% 4               20% 2              
Founding XP 37% 11 73% 8 27% 3               45% 5              
BA Graduate 10% 3 100% 3 0% -            100% 3              
Experienced Founders 23% 7 86% 6 14% 1               71% 5              
All ESS non-ESS Difference
Table 2: Founder Background Variables 
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8.3 Hypothesis Variables:  
 
 
The Hypothesis Variables table (Table 3) presents the distributions of continuous hypothesis variables, considered as the mean & median 
of (1) the entire sample, (2) the sub-sample of ESS observations, (3) the sub-sample of non-ESS observations, and (4) the difference between 
the ESS and non-ESS distributions.  Star(s) next to a difference value indicates the degree to which it is statistically significant21. 
Table 3 presents four of the five hypothesis variables22, find the “Experienced Founder” variable in Table 2.  See Table 1 for the distribution 
between the ESS and non-ESS sub-samples. 
An observable pattern in Table 3 is the presence of large outliers affecting the sample means, 
as illustrated by the differences between mean and medians.  The t-tests conducted on the 
mean differences between the ESS and non-ESS samples account for this through the inclusion 
of the standard error term.  This makes the significant difference between the Wage-
Compensated FTE distributions of ESS and non-ESS firms an interesting finding. 
Given the limited sample size, it is possible that recasting some of the continuous variables as 
discrete variables with 2-4 possible alternatives would reduce the impact of large outliers.  The 
second hypothesis variables are meant to instrument diversification along different axis.  One 
might argue that the marginal reduction in idiosyncratic risk becomes non-significant after a 
certain number of revenue streams/customers. 
  
                                                 
21 ∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.1, ∗∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.05, ∗∗∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.01. 
22 Described in Chapter 7.3. 
Hypothesis Variables
n=30
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Revenue Streams 3.4                 2.0              4.6             2.5            2.4              2.0              2.2             0.5             
Customers LTM 21.5              1.0              38.1           2.0            4.4              1.0              33.7           1.0             
Wage-Compensated FTEs 5.1                 2.5               8.4             4.5             1.8              1.5              (**) 6.6 3.0             
Raised Capital 7,470,313     3,500,000   9,535,294 5,000,000 5,130,000  3,000,000  4,405,294 2,000,000 
All ESS non-ESS Difference
Table 3: Hypothesis Variables 
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8.4 Control Variables: 
 
 
The Control Variables table (Table 4) presents the distributions of continuous control variables23, considered as the mean & median of (1) 
the entire sample, (2) the sub-sample of ESS observations, (3) the sub-sample of non-ESS observations, and (4) the difference between the 
ESS and non-ESS distributions.  Star(s) next to a difference value indicates the degree to which it is statistically significant24. 
See Table 1 for the distribution between the ESS and non-ESS sub-samples. 
 
As seen in Table 3, Table 4 also shows signs of clear outliers (particularly in the ESS 
distributions).  These are observable through the large differences between the mean and 
median values of the Valuation and SalesLTM variables.  The estimated time to market 
variable (TTM) behaves differently than the two other control variables.  There are lower 
differences between the mean and median, which do not coincide across the different samples. 
8.5 Cross-Sectional Regressions (CSRs) 
The cross-sectional regressions test the four hypotheses presented and will collectively 
provide an answer to the research question of the thesis. 
The first three regressions are presented using the number of planned revenue streams as the 
instrument for second hypothesis diversification.  The last three are presented using the 




                                                 
23 See Chapter 7.4 for variable definitions. 
24 ∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.1, ∗∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.05, ∗∗∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.01. 
25 The methodology is further explained in Chapter 7.5. 




Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Valuation (to nearest 000) 22,480,000  11,650,000  28,859,000  11,800,000  15,250,000  11,500,000  13,609,000  300,000     
Sales LTM (to nearest 000) 3,724,000     1,000,000    5,439,000    1,200,000    1,895,000    540,000        3,544,000    660,000     
TTM 2.9                 2.5                2.5                3.0                3.3                2.0                0.8-                1.0              
All ESS non-ESS Difference
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CSR1: Revenue Stream Diversification + No Controls 
CSR1 includes a total of four variables and 
is run as a logit regression without 
controls. 
Note that the “RaisedCapital” variable 
should be multiplied by 1”, as it represents 
values that changes in the millions.  Its 





CSR2: Revenue Stream Diversification + Primary Controls 
CSR2 includes a total of six variables and is 
run as a logit regression.  In addition to the 
four hypothesis variables, it makes use of 
the primary control variables: “Valuation” 
& “SalesLTMpre”. 
Note that the “RaisedCapital”, “Valuation” 
and “SalesLTMpre” variables should be 
multiplied by 1”, as they represent values 
that change in the millions.  Their altered 
coefficients become: -0.006, -0.10, -0.712, 
respectively. 
 
CSR3: Revenue Stream Diversification + Alternative Controls 
CSR3 includes a total of six variables and 
is run as a logit regression.  In addition to 
the four hypothesis variables, it makes use 
of the alternative control variables: 
“Valuation” & “TTMarket”26. 
Note that the “RaisedCapital” and 
“Valuation” variables should be multiplied 
by 1”, as they represent values that change 
in the millions.  Their altered coefficients 
become: -0.035, -0.055, respectively. 
                                                 
26 Estimated Time to Market at point of initial investment. 
 37 
CSR4: Customer Portfolio Diversification + No Controls 
CSR4 includes a total of four variables and 
is run as a logit regression without controls. 
Note that the “RaisedCapital” variable 
should be multiplied by 1”, as it represents 
values that changes in the millions.  Its 





CSR5: Customer Portfolio Diversification + Primary Controls 
CSR5 includes a total of six variables and is 
run as a logit regression.  In addition to the 
four hypothesis variables, it makes use of 
the primary control variables: “Valuation” 
& “SalesLTMpre”. 
Note that the “RaisedCapital”, “Valuation” 
and “SalesLTMpre” variables should be 
multiplied by 1”, as they represent values 
that change in the millions.  Their altered 




CSR6: Customer Portfolio Diversification + Alternative Controls  
CSR6 includes a total of six variables and is 
run as a logit regression.  In addition to the 
four hypothesis variables, it makes use of 
the alternative control variables: 
“Valuation” & “TTMarket”27. 
Note that the “RaisedCapital” and 
“Valuation” variables should be multiplied 
by 1”, as they represent values that change 
in the millions. Their altered coefficients 
become: -0.225, 0.060, respectively.  
                                                 
27 Estimated Time to Market at point of initial investment. 
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8.6 General Comments 
Brief comments will first be presented for CSR 1-3, then for CSR 4-6.  The primary cross-
sectional regressions, CSR2 & CSR5, are then compared.  Insignificant results will be 
discussed in relation to the consideration of the four hypotheses in Chapter 9.7. 
8.6.1 CSR1-3: 
There persists a positive correlation between the number of FTEs and the probability of 
achieving ESS.  The same is true for the binary presence of experienced founders.  While the 
number of FTEs is consistently significant at the 5% level, experienced founders vary in 
significance between the 5- and 10% level.  The presence of these variables indicates an 
increase in the probability of achieving ESS. 
The constant term remains significant at the 1- to 5% level with a negative coefficient, 
indicating an initial tilt towards probability of non-ESS. 
The level of sales LTM is an instrument to control for whether the firm is primarily faced with 
technological or commercial risk in the observed period.  The variable is statistically 
significant at the 10% level with a slightly negative coefficient in CSR2.  This implies that 
sample firms with higher levels of sales in the last twelve months pre-investment are slightly 
less likely to have achieved ESS within three years.  A possible interpretation is that the 
commercial risk is statistically significantly higher than the technological risk in the observed 
three-year period.  When holding slopes constant at the mean, an increase in sales LTM of 
1MNOK is estimated to reduce the probability of ESS by 3.58%28.  
8.6.2 CSR4-6: 
Replacing the instrument for diversification, the pattern from CSR1-3 is again observable for 
the number of FTEs and the presence of experienced founders.  These two variables thus 
remain statistically significant positive predictors of ESS through all 6 iterations of the cross-
sectional regressions. 
                                                 
28 This effect is subject to diminishing returns as the CSRs are run as logit regressions. 
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The constant term remains significant through all three regressions, with comparable 
negative statistics.  The constant term thus becomes a statistically significant indicator of an 
initial tilt towards non-ESS through all six regression iterations. 
CSR5 additionally yields statistically significant results for the customer diversification 
variable, the level of raised capital variable, as well as the level of sales LTM pre-
investment.  These are variables likely to increase as the firm enters an 
implementation/commercialization phase.  All coefficients are negative, possibly indicating 
that the implementation/commercialization phase holds more immediate risk in the observed 
three-year period than does the phase of technological development. 
Collinearity issues are found in CSR5 & 6 between the “CustLTM”, “Employee10” and 
“Valuation” variables.  Replacing the instrument used for testing the second hypothesis with 
its counterpart remedies all cases of collinearity. 
8.6.3 CSR2 & 5: 
The focus on the primary control regressions is due to the mentioned recording error risk 
present in the use of the TTM estimate.  The alternative control regressions also both explain 
a significantly lower portion of the sample variance than do the primary control regressions, 
when considering the adjusted R2. 
The variations in the first and second sets of regressions do not impact the significance of the 
number of FTEs or the presence of experienced founders. 
A difference between the two iterations is the significance of the diversification instrument in 
CSR5.  It is possible that customer diversification captures some of the same effect as the risk 
variable (“SalesLTM”).  I argue that the number of customers is likely to rise as the company 
enters the commercialization phase, thus possibly creating overlap.   
Due to the collinearity issue between the “CustLTM”, “Employee10” and “Valuation” 
variables, the CSR2 becomes the primary regression analysed when considering the four 
hypotheses. 
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8.7 Comments on Hypotheses 
The considered results are achieved in a regression run alongside three other hypothesis 
variables.  The results are additionally controlled for the difference in progress by individual 
portfolio investments through the use of the “Valuation” and “SalesLTM” variables29. 
Hypothesis 1: Experienced Founders are Correlated with ESS 
After having concluded the cross-sectional regression analyses, I am forced to reject the null 
hypothesis that this is not the case at the 10% level of significance. The variable is found 
to hold statistical and practical significance in all six iterations of the analysis.  The presence 
of experienced founders acts as a significant predictor of whether or not a sample firm will 
have achieved Early Stage Success three years post-investment.  This supplements the results 
of Bernstein et al. (2015), who present suggestive causal evidence that early-stage investors 
are more likely to invest in firms with strong founding teams.  It is a new finding, as Bernstein 
et al. (2015) make no conclusive comment on whether this focus is good or bad.  This finding 
indicates that experienced investors appear to be right to focus their attention as Bernstein et 
al. (2015) observe that they do. 
Holding the variable slopes constant at their means for CSR2, having an experienced founder 
team is estimated to increase the probability of achieving ESS by 18.1%.  The result 
supplements the findings of Bernstein et al. (2015), who propose suggestive causal evidence 
of a link between experienced founding teams and success in attracting early-stage investment. 
Hypothesis 2: Focus on diversification is positively correlated with ESS 
After having concluded the cross-sectional regression analyses, I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that this is not the case.  Diversification is tested along two dimensions, the only 
iteration which produced significant results (CSR5) suffered from multiple strong collinearity 
issues.  In the remaining five iterations none of the diversification variables produced 
statistically significant results. 
                                                 
29 Described further in Chapter 7.4.  
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Several possible alternative diversification instruments gathered, unfortunately suffer from 
clear cases of OVB30 – the variables were therefore excluded from the analysis.  The second 
hypothesis has clearly shed light upon the need to be strict when defining variables, the lack 
of which may have contributed to non-significant results. 
Hypothesis 3: The number of wage-compensated employees31 is positively correlated with ESS 
After having concluded the cross-sectional regression analyses, I am forced to reject the null 
hypothesis that this is not the case at the 5% level of significance.  The variable is found 
to hold statistical and practical significance in all six iterations of the analysis.  The number of 
wage-compensated employees acts as a significant predictor of whether or not a sample firm 
will have achieved Early-Stage Success three years post-investment.  This supplements the 
findings of Gelderen et al. (2005) who find that nascent entrepreneurs who work full-time on 
the startup are more likely to succeed.  It is a new finding, as Gelderen et al. (2005) observe 
nascent entrepreneurs aiming to create a firm, while I observe ESVC funded startups aiming 
to create value over a three-year period. 
Holding the variable slopes constant at their means for CSR2, increasing the number of FTEs 
by one is estimated to increase the probability of achieving ESS by 8.7%32. 
Hypothesis 4: The Size of the Initial ESVC Investment Correlates Positively With ESS 
After having concluded the cross-sectional regression analyses, I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that this is not the case.  In the observed sample, the level of raised capital appears 
not to be a significant predictor of ESS.   
This does not support the findings of Robb & Robinson (2009), who find that nascent firms 
with higher access to capital are more likely to success.  The results are, however, not directly 
comparable.  This is both in terms of median investments per firm, and as Rob & Robinson 
(2009) primarily measure the effect of debt, while I am measuring the size of equity 
investment. 
                                                 
30 Listen in Chapter 8.8.2, paragraph relating to OVB. 
31 Being a wage-compensated employee is defined as holding less than 5% equity or equity worth less than 2MNOK in the observed portfolio firm. 
32 This effect is subject to diminishing returns as the CSRs are run as logit regressions. 
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8.8 Possible Implications of Results 
From the perspective of the firm, the results do not become practically applicable until one 
can argue that a causal effect is present.  This follows as the firm would have to alter its own 
behaviour – for example by hiring more employees than originally planned.  If there is no 
causal connection between dependent and independent variable, the firm would be increasing 
its costs without improving its chances of success. This limits the usefulness of the results for 
the early-stage firm. 
From the ESVC perspective, the results become practically applicable when a strong claim 
of correlation is made with a representative sample.  While ESS does not guarantee AS, I 
argue33 that achieving ESS is equal to an unidentified, significant improvement in the expected 
probability of AS.  The ESVC might also use the results to improve corporate governance for 
portfolio investments, though this would require a causal connection to be present. 
8.9 Concluding Remarks 
The results may be interpreted as indicative of present correlations.  They are not robust 
enough to argue for the presence of causal connections.  More analysis would have to be 
conducted to consider the true internal validity of the study. 
The results appear useful in the following ways: (1) The results indicate that the methodology 
may be useful, assuming that ESS firms have a higher probability of achieving AS than non-
ESS firms, (2) future research need not be as exploratory in nature and (3) the implied null 
hypothesis of the research question has been rejected.  The research question of this thesis is:  
Are there statistically significant and relevant correlations between objective and quantifiable 
variables within startups, known at the point of initial ESVC investment, and ESS? 
Having concluded the empirical research, I am forced to reject the null hypothesis that this 
is not the case at the 5% level of significance.  This does not necessarily imply that the null 
hypothesis is wrong, though the empirical analysis conducted forces its temporary rejection. 
                                                 
33 See “The Value of Measuring Early-Stage Success”, Chapter 5.1. 
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9. Discussions 
9.1 Early-Stage Success 
Consideration of the ESS variable is critical in order to be able to properly evaluate the 
usefulness of the employed methodology.  I therefore consider, (1) the theoretical value of 
ESS, (2) the practical definition of ESS, employed by this thesis: 
9.1.1 Considering the Theoretical Value of ESS 
Startups, from their first interaction with professional equity investors to their transformation 
into a mature commercial enterprise, is a considerably heterogeneous population.  I argue that 
sub-sampling this population into stages should reduce its heterogeneity, allowing for 
increased resolution of study.  Though this in parallel reduces the external validity of the 
results, the increased decision relevant information for ESVCs makes further study an 
interesting prospect. 
9.1.2 Considering the Practical Definition of ESS 
A caveat relating to the definition of ESS34, is in my opinion the somewhat arbitrary 
quantitative requirements of sales/raised capital to be considered an ESS firm35.  Furthermore, 
the two variables used to construct the ESS instrument cannot themselves be empirically tested 
for correlation with ESS. 
9.2 Data Scarcity 
The definition of the ESS variable opens for detailed study, which may be quantitatively tested 
within a practical framework.  If high-quality representative data-samples cannot be obtained, 
however, the framework is rendered impotent. 
Data collection of sufficiently high quality appears hard to attain.  I base this statement on the 
references made in the observed academic literature (Bernstein, Korteweg, & Laws, 2015) 
                                                 
34 See Chapter 7.3.1. 
35 The quantitative requirements have been considered reasonable by independent academic and market professionals. 
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(Robb & Robinson, 2009) (Gelderen, Thurik, & Bosma, 2005) (Kerr, Lerner, & Schoar, 2010), 
as well as my own experiences. 
An implication of data scarcity is that it may negatively impact the volume of conducted 
research.  I hope that this risk may be partially mitigated by the research done by this thesis, 
hopefully increasing the motivation to gather required data in spite of its scarcity. 
9.3 Internal & External Validity 
9.3.1 A Discussion of Internal Validity 
Several threats to internal validity have been identified: 
The data-sample is of limited size:  This limits the number of variables that may be regressed 
simultaneously and renders some inadequate for analysis, increasing the risk of Omitted 
Variable Bias (OVB).  The direct risk of OVB is that the current results of the empirical 
analysis may be misleading, as an omitted variable may alter the statistical significance of the 
included variables.  OVB is the largest identified threat to internal validity. 
Recording risk:  As the sample investments primarily took place between 2010-2012, there 
is exists recording risk for variables based solely on interviews conducted in late 2018. 
The population may have changed significantly since the observation period:  The sudden 
2014 fall in Brent Crude Oil prices impacted Norway more profoundly than the average 
western market, as oil is Norway’s primary export good.  Combined with the growing focus 
on the environmental impact of fossil fuels, this was complicit in increasing the national focus 
on a Norwegian post-oil economy.  Norway has since seen a divestment over time from the 
oil industry and a significantly increased focus on the startup sector (Abelia, 2017). 
Lack of ESVC controls: In order to isolate the impact of different startup variables from the 
effects of governance, the following three things should be controlled for: (1) ESVC general 
skill level, (2) ESVC learning effect over time, (3) ESVC specialization. 
(1) Variance in ESVC general skill level implies that the behaviour of a single Norwegian 
ESVC may not be representative of the larger population.  On the contrary, using data from 
only one ESVC partly mitigates the risk that the study is capturing the effects of different 
ESVC skill levels, as opposed to inherent differences in the individual startup.  If data from 
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multiple ESVCs were to be aggregated into a single sample, a control for variance of ESVC 
skill should be included. 
(2) The ESVC may improve its skill over time through a learning effect.  Splitting the sample 
in half by the year of funding, then testing the difference in ESS probability, indicates that 
there is no statistically significant learning effect in the sample.  Given a larger data-sample, 
a control for this possible effect should be included. 
(3) The thesis does not control for ESVC specialization, that certain startups may be a better 
fit for certain ESVCs.  This deals a significant blow to the internal validity of the study, when 
considering whether the results of the sample are representative for the larger population as a 
whole. 
9.3.2 A Consideration of External Validity 
I consider different relevant comparable geographical markets, ranked by their perceived 
comparability, as ESVC-funded startups in: 
1. Scandinavian countries 
2. Nordic countries 
3. Northern-European countries 
4. Northern-European & North American countries 
5. Northern-European, North American & EU countries 
6. Western countries 
7. Non-Western countries 
Considering the validity of the study in the same market, but over longer periods of time, 
other concerns become more relevant.  Ewens et al. (2017) argue that a consequence of the 
Amazon Web Services rollout was the development of the “Spray and Pray” investment 
strategy36.  Significant alterations of ESVC investment strategies may reduce or eliminate the 
external validity of this study over time. 
The empirical analysis is ecologically valid, as it is entirely based on observational data.  
There has been no experimentational recreation of the population over time. 
 
                                                 
36 See Chapter 4.5. 
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10. Future Research Steps 
Though half of the hypotheses failed to reject their null hypotheses, each failure revealed 
valuable insights relating to the improvement of future research.  This section considers future 
research steps at the macro-, methodological- and micro-level.   It is not an exhaustive list.  
Not all research questions are elaborated upon or followed by suggestions for hypotheses. 
10.1.1 Macro-Level Future Research Steps 
Does Early-Stage Success (ESS) correlate with Absolute Success37 (AS)?  This would be 
difficult to test empirically, as there might be more than a decade from the point of ESS, until 
one can consider whether AS has occurred.  The test would indicate whether ESS correlates 
significantly with AS, also observing the significance of its coefficient.  Significant results 
would empirically complement the theoretical argument that ESS is a valid predictor of AS. 
Consideration of institutional cooperation.  The empirical literature indicates that 
meaningful data is scarce concerning startups (e.g. (Bernstein, Korteweg, & Laws, 2015) 
(Robb & Robinson, 2009)); this has been reflected by my own experience.  A meaningful 
contribution to future research may be the further development of institutional cooperation 
between academic and market institutions.   
Efficient categorization of startup data, in both the Seed and Venture Capital markets, would 
be a valuable indirect contribution to future research.  An example might be the establishment 
of an institutional cooperation between The Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) and the 
Nordic Venture Network38.  A top-down approach to the collection of data might effectively 
create a useful database for future research. 
10.1.2 Methodological Future Research Steps  
These future research steps are aimed at improving the methodology employed in this thesis, 
following results may then be compared with results using the present methodology.  
Recommended methodological alterations are listed below: 
                                                 
37 Absolute Success: Liquid returns on investment for ESVC investors. 
38 The club of leading venture capital investors in the Nordic region: https://nordicventurenetwork.com/ 
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Address internal validity issues.  The discussed internal validity issues should be addressed.  
Significant results should then be re-tested in order to observe whether or not the results are 
impacted by the alterations. 
Stricter variable definition.  Further significant results may have emerged, had certain 
variables in the sample been more strictly defined.  Effort should be paid to ensure that 
necessary variable strictness keeps significant results from being lost.  This may be applied 
both to testing of new variables, as well as to variable re-testing. 
Increased sample size.  The thesis employs a sample of 30 observations.  Increasing this 
would facilitate further sub-sampling and controlling of the data, increasing flexibility in the 
analysis.  There were several instances during the empirical testing, where the data indicated 
that further sub-sampling might have produced valid contributions to the research question.  
10.1.3 Micro-Level Future Research Steps 
These future research steps primarily aim to suggest new research questions and hypotheses.  
Based on what research questions and hypotheses are tested, different alterations to the 
methodology may be needed.  In any scenario, the observed threats to internal validity should 
be addressed. 
The future research steps are structured in five categories, listed below: 
Advisory Services 
Future research steps relating to the possible impact of different advisory services.  
Does the use of an Advisory Board (AB) correlate with an increased probability of 
achieving ESS?  The database shows that less than 25% of observed firms had made use of 
any forms of ABs at the point of initial investment.  With a larger data-sample one may 
empirically test whether the use of ABs correlates with ESS.  AB exemplifies a variable that 
would benefit from a stricter variable definition. 
Does the use of financial advisory services correlate with the probability of ESS?  The 
database shows that less than 20% of observed firms had employed external professional 
financial services at the point of initial investment.  With a larger data-sample one may 
empirically test whether the use of external financial advisory services correlates with ESS.  
Future study would benefit from stricter variable definition. 
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Founders 
Future research steps relating to attributes of the founders of target firms. 
Are founders working full-time in the startup positively correlated with ESS?  At the 
point of initial investment, database founders range from being an FTE, to complete non-
involvement without stock in the company.  To test whether increased founder involvement 
correlates with ESS, a variable measuring founder involvement in the firm could be defined.  
This would have implications for how ESVCs should value the founder when considering their 
initial investment into a target firm.  This research question builds on comparable findings in 
existing academic literature39. 
Do specific experienced founder traits correlate more or less with ESS?  The empirical 
study conducted by this thesis implies that previous founding experience may correlate 
positively with ESS.  Can a sub-sample of founders with previous founding experience find 
more specific traits that correlate more or less with ESS?  E.g.: (1) Previous success, (2) 
Number of previous firms founded, (3) number of previous firms run, (4) founder age. 
Is ‘Domain Experience’ a statistically significant predictor of ESS?  This may be either a 
standalone variable, or e.g. in combination with previous founding experience, forming an 
alternative definition for “Experienced Founder”.  One may then test whether education or 
work experience is the most important predictor of ESS.  Domain experience may benefit from 
stricter variable definition. 
Study based around the value of the founding team.  If different traits within the founding 
team can be found to correlate significantly with an increased probability of ESS, then an 
argument can be made for the valuation of these traits.  Examples of hypotheses to test are 
listed below: 
• Does being a Business Administration Graduate founder have a significant impact on the probability of ESS? 
• Is there a statistically significant difference in the probability of achieving ESS between firms founded by 
individuals, versus firms founded by other firms or research groups? 
Ownership/Valuations 
Future research steps relating to the possible impact of different levels of ownership and/or valuations. 
                                                 
39 FTE Founders are more likely to succeed in the nascent entrepreneurship stage than founders who are not FTE (Gelderen, Thurik, & Bosma, 2005). 
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Does the ESVC share of the firm, post-money at initial investment, correlate with ESS? 
Employment 
Future research steps relating to attributes and the impact of employees in target firms. 
Do different classes of employees impact the probability of ESS differently?  Classifying 
different groups of employees would allow testing for whether all employee classes 
significantly improve the probability of ESS.  Different possible classifications of employees: 
(1) Founding Employee, (2) Management Employee, (3) Non-Management Employee (3.1) 
Administrative Employee, (3.2) Operational Employee. 
Diversification 
Future research steps relating to the possible impact of diversification 
Do the number of people in the founding team or management correlate with the 
probability of ESS?  In attempting to answer this research question, one might test several 
hypotheses, some examples given: (1) One versus several team members, (2) splitting the 
distribution into quartiles and testing each quartile against the entire sample average.  
Does having multiple Areas of Expertise in the founding team and/or management 
correlate with ESS?40  A stricter definition of Areas of Expertise should be employed before 
attempting to answer this question. 
Do firms with both sexes represented in the founding team and/or management have an 
increased probability of achieving ESS?41    
                                                 
40 Requires controlling for the number of people in the founding team or management. 
41 Requires controlling for the number of people and AoEs in the teams. 
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11. Conclusion 
The Norwegian startup economy is in rapid growth (Abelia, 2017).  Meanwhile, technological 
advances are shown to alter investment strategies and increase the prevalence of early-stage 
investments with limited governance (Ewens, Nanda, & Rhodes-Kropf, 2017). 
The primary source of early-stage growth appears to be funding combined with the underlying 
potential of the firm, rather than the added value of governance (Sorensen, 2006).  This implies 
that effective methods for identifying startups with high underlying potential is a primary 
method of increasing ESVC returns over time.  Observation of experienced early-stage 
investor preferences may aid less experienced investors to increase returns (Bernstein, 
Korteweg, & Laws, 2015).  Such observation fails, however, to answer the question of whether 
investors are right to focus their attention as they do. 
The here conducted empirical analysis indicates possible correlations between pre-investment 
startup traits and Early-Stage Success (ESS).  Though the results provide limited direct 
decision-relevant information for ESVCs, further improved research may reach more robust 
conclusions.  If future discovered relationships could be reliably quantified, the resulting 
reduced risk in ESVC investment decisions could improve expected long-run average returns. 
The hope is that this thesis may contribute to increasing the total volume of available venture 
capital in Norway.  This would be useful at a time when the Norwegian startup economy is 
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The Appendix includes a collection of all the variables gathered during the data-collection 
process, not considered in the main empirical analysis.  The first section defines each variable, 
the second presents tables of descriptive statistics for the different classes of variables. 
13.1 Definitions 
Below are the definitions of all gathered variables, not included in the main empirical analysis.  
Certain variables are based entirely on interview data.  These variables are marked with a star 
in the variable name. 
13.1.1 General 
➢ Sector - Categorical variable, string.  What sector does the firm primarily operate within? 
➢ Function - Categorical variable, string.  Does the firm primarily fulfil an operative or support 
function in its broader industry and sector? 
➢ Year Pre-Funding - Calculated field, integer.  How many years has the firm existed, pre-
funding? 
➢ Primary Revenue Category - Categorical variable, string. Is the primary expected revenue 
category of the firm a product, a service or a servitization? 
➢ Pre-Sales? - Binary variable.  Has the firm completed pre-sales exceeding 500 000 NOK? 
13.1.2 Financial 
➢ Total sales - Continuous variable, integer.  Total registered sales since the creation of the 
firm? 
➢ Total sales 3 years pre-investment - Continuous variable, integer. 
➢ Total Revenue - Continuous variable, integer.  Total registered revenue, including non-sale 
sources of income. 
➢ SG&A/Total Costs (TC) - Continuous variable, percentage.  Sales, General & Administration 
(SG&A) over Total Costs (TC) in the year of investment. 
➢ SG&A/Sales LTM - Continuous variable, percentage.  Capped at maximum 2000% 
➢ SG&A/Revenue LTM - Continuous variable, percentage.  Capped at maximum 2000% 
13.1.3 Founder Background 
➢ *Years of founding experience - Continuous variable, string.  Accumulated years of founding 
experience in the founding team.  Sub-Sample of firms with founding experience. 
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13.1.4 Equity Variables 
➢ Share retained post-investment (pre) - Continuous variable, percentage.  Total share of firm 
retained by founding team post-money at initial investment. 
➢ Share retained 3 years post-investment (post) - Continuous variable, percentage.  Share of 
firm retained by founding team 3 years post initial investment. 
➢ Value of founder equity, pre (VFE) - Calculated variable, integer.  Value of the founding 
team’s equity post-money at initial investment (equal to Valuation * Founder Share post-money).  
➢ VFE (post) - Calculated variable, integer.  Value of the founding team’s equity 3 years post initial 
investment (equal to Valuation * Founder Share post-money). 
➢ Founding team gain/loss - Calculated variable, integer.  Total founding team gain/loss of 
equity during the observed three-year period. 
➢ Percent change in value of founder equity - Calculated variable, percentage.  During the 
observed three-year period. 
➢ Annual gain/loss, founding team - Calculated variable, integer.  Annual gain/loss of founder 
equity value. 
➢ Annual percent gain/loss, founding team - Calculated variable, percentage.  Annual gain/loss 
of founder equity value, percent. 
13.1.5 Diversification Variables 
➢ Both sex founders? - Binary variable. 
➢ *Both sex management? - Binary variable.  At the point of initial investment. 
➢ *Areas of expertise, founders - Continuous variable, integer.  Number of independent 
educational and/or professional founder backgrounds. 
➢ *Areas of expertise, management - Continuous variable, integer.  Number of independent 
educations and/or professional management backgrounds. 
➢ *Advisory Board (AB)? - Binary variable.  Presence of AB at the point of initial investment. 
➢ *Number of different areas of expertise, AB - Continuous variable, integer.  A sub-sample of 
firms with AB. 
➢ Customers Last Twelve Months (LTM)? - Calculated variable, binary.  Did the firm have paying 
customers LTM, which generated total sales LTM exceeding 1MNOK? 
➢ *Number of customers >10% of total sales LTM - Continuous variable, integer. 
13.1.6 Employment Variables 
➢ *Number of wage-compensated part-time employees - Continuous variable, integer.  
Minimum of 50% of full employment required.  Employees are defined as holding less than 5% or 
2MNOK worth of equity in the firm. 
13.1.7 Governance Variables 
➢ *Replaced CEO at point of investment? - Binary variable.  Started process to replace CEO at 
point of initial investment, concluded within 1 year. 
➢ *Hired BA Graduate at point of investment? - Binary variable. 
➢ Number of Investor-Appointed Board Members (IABM) - Continuous variable, integer.  At 
point of initial investment. 
➢ *Hired other support/administrative functions at point of investment? - Binary variable. 
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13.1.8 Advisory Variables + 
➢ *Employed external legal advice pre-investment? - Binary variable. 
➢ *Relevant Patent protection pre-investment? - Binary variable.  This is a sub-sample of firms 
who self-report a high degree of technological innovation. 
➢ *Employed external financial advice pre-investment? - Binary variable. 
13.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Below are tables of descriptive statistics for the defined variables not included in the main 
empirical analysis.  Certain variables are simple derivatives of other variables (e.g. Annual 
Gain/Loss Founding team is the total gain/loss divided by three), these are not included in the 
statistics.  Statistics are not included for variables conditional on other variables (e.g. years of 





% n % n % n % n
n 100% 30               53% 16           47% 14                  6% 2
Function
Operational 47% 14 57% 8 43% 6                    14% 2
Support 53% 16 50% 8 50% 8                    0% 0
Primary Rev. Category
Product 77% 23 52% 12 48% 11                  4% 1
Service 13% 4 50% 2 50% 2                    0% 0
Servitization 10% 3 67% 2 33% 1                    33% 1
Pre-Sales? 43% 13 62% 8 38% 5                    23% 3
Both Sex Founders? 13% 4 50% 2 50% 2                   0% 0
Both Sex Management? 27% 8 75% 6 25% 2                   50% 4
Advisory Board? 23% 7 57% 4 43% 3                   14% 1
Customers LTM? 50% 15 60% 9 40% 6                    20% 3
Replaced CEO? 33% 10 50% 5 50% 5 0% 0
Hired BA Graduate? 13% 4 50% 2 50% 2 0% 0
Hired Other Support/Adm.? 30% 9 56% 5 44% 4 11% 1
Hired Legal Services? 93% 28 54% 15 46% 13 7% 2
Hired Financial Services? 17% 5 40% 2 60% 3 -20% -1
All ESS non-ESS Difference
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the binary variables gathered but not included in the empirical analysis.  Statistically significant 
differences between the ESS and non-ESS distributions are marked with star(s).  ∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.1, ∗∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.05, ∗∗∗ =







Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Years Pre-Funding 4.7                3.5             5.1                3.0             4.4             4.0             0.7                         1.0-              
Total Sales (To Closest 100') 10,400,000  2,400,000  14,600,000  1,750,000  5,500,000  2,700,000  9,100,000             950,000-     
Total Sales 3y Pre (To Closest 100') 7,600,000    2,050,000  10,900,000  1,700,000  3,800,000  2,250,000  7,100,000             550,000-     
Total Revenue (To Closest 100') 11,500,000  3,450,000  16,000,000  4,150,000  6,300,000  3,450,000  9,700,000             700,000     
SG&A/TC 85.0% 89.6% 86.5% 90.5% 83.2% 89.1% 3.3% 1.5%
SG&A/Sales LTM 646.2% 222.5% 883.0% 225.1% 291.0% 208.5% 592.0% 16.6%
SG&A/Revenue LTM 314.6% 174.9% 370.9% 143.4% 244.1% 206.6% 126.8% -63.2%
Share Retained (Pre) 29.0% 27.0% 33.3% 29.5% 24.1% 22.5% 9.2% 7.0%
Share Retained (Post) 13.2% 6.1% 18.5% 11.5% 7.1% 2.5% (*) 11.4% 9.0%
VFE (Pre) (To Closest 100') 6,000,000    2,907,500  8,600,000    4,716,000  3,100,000  2,787,500  (*) 5,500,000 1,928,500  
VFE (Post) (To Closest 100') 8,700,000    2,538,950  15,000,000  5,075,000  1,400,000  328,500     (**) 13,600,000 4,746,500  
Founder Gain/Loss (To Closest 100') 2,700,000    73,250-        6,500,000    237,500     1,600,000-  475,000-     8,100,000             712,500     
% ∆ VFE 47.2% -4.3% 120.8% 45.8% -36.9% -23.6% (***) 157.7% 1                  
Number of AoEs - Founder(s) 1.6                1.0              2.0                2.0              1.1              1.0              (**) 0.9 1                  
Number of AoEs - Management 1.9                2.0              2.3                2.0              1.4              1.0              (**) 0.9 1.0              
# Cust >10% LTM Sales 1.0                1.0              1.1                1.0              0.8              -              0.3                         100.0%
Employees 50%+ 5.9                4.0              9.1                5.0              2.2              2.0              (**) 6.9 3.0              
# IABM 1.6                1.5              1.4                1.0              1.8              2.0              0.4-                         1.0-              
ESS non-ESS DifferenceAll
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables gathered but not included in the empirical analysis.  Statistically significant 
differences between the ESS and non-ESS distributions are marked with star(s).  ∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.1, ∗∗ = 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.05, ∗∗∗ =
𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 0.01.  See Chapter 11.1 for variable definitions. 
 
 
